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In 1984, the most popular weekly magazine in the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR), the Neue Berliner Illustrierte (NBI) reported across four pages on the case 
of Gerhard W. from Görlitz. In this article, Gerhard, a metal worker in his mid-
forties, confessed to the various crimes that he had committed before his arrest by 
the Volkspolizei. At first, he had apparently only admitted to breaking into a garage 
and stealing petrol for his stolen car. Yet when officers searched his house they 
found more of the spoils of his career as a criminal: six television sets, eight cassette 
recorders, four coffee machines, a dozen electric power drills, skis, tents, garden 
chairs, egg cups, fridges, glasses, tyres, motorbike helmets, car parts from at least 
thirty cars, a chainsaw, parasols, books, games and, a cuddly toy. There were even 
several stolen sheep in the cattle shed outside. In all, Gerhard W. admitted to 
burgling fifty garages, fifteen bungalows and nine farms, taking approximately eight
hundred items (see photograph one).2 Although similar instances of 
Alltagskriminalität (everyday criminality) rarely occurred on a scale comparable to 
this one-man crime wave, the undoctored crime statistics of the ruling Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) show that incidents thereof, such as burglary, 
theft, robbery, assault, arson, rape and, murder, were common and numerous in the 
GDR.3
More striking than the extent of Gerhard W.’s criminal adventures is the fact 
that the NBI reported them to citizens of the GDR at all, for acknowledging that 
21. A small part of Gerhard W.’s haul of stolen goods (“Vernehmung,” NBI, 
26/1984, 28-32).
3crime existed in the GDR directly challenged the SED’s claim to have created a 
society of actually existing socialism. Marxist-Leninist doctrine places the 
exploitation of workers by the capitalist elite at the root of all crime.4 Crime and 
criminality are thus “alien” (wesensfremd) to the very essence of the prevailing 
societal conditions in socialist and communist societies and ought to disappear as 
phenomena as soon as socialism is established.5 Yet although the SED regime 
certainly did massage statistics for propaganda purposes in order to demonstrate its 
effective political leadership, it did not deny that everyday criminality existed and 
persisted in the GDR.6 The Party’s annually published official statistics showed 
citizens that over 100,000 instances of everyday criminality occurred in each year of
the state’s existence from 1949 to 1989.7 Moreover, a range of other official sources 
consistently communicated to citizens that crime was occurring. In fact, the regime 
regarded Öffentlichkeitsarbeit concerning criminality as an “essential component 
part in its prevention.”8 Consequently, reports of crimes appeared in the regional and
national press, and criminal cases were dramatized in hugely popular television 
detective shows such as Polizeiruf 110 and Der Staatsanwalt hat das Wort, 
numerous feature films, and novels.9 
This article examines how the SED communicated and explained the 
existence and persistence of everyday criminality to its citizens. It analyses the 
regime’s account of everyday criminality as it appeared in reports and commentaries
in the pages of the NBI. First published in 1945, the NBI quickly became the most 
popular weekly magazine in the GDR. Its sales figures show that vast numbers of 
citizens accessed the magazine.10 Throughout the 1960s the NBI had a circulation of 
up to eight hundred thousand copies per week.11 Weekly circulation remained well 
above seven hundred thousand in the 1970s.12 In the 1980s each edition of the 
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crimes did appear in other press publications, such as the regime’s official 
newspaper Neues Deutschland, many citizens baulked at the overtly political and 
often dense nature of these offerings. In stark contrast, the NBI appeared to citizens 
as anything but a dry conduit for propaganda. That is not to say that the magazine 
was apolitical. Political pieces featured in its pages and many articles did contain 
some sort of underlying political message. Yet the magazine’s structure, format and 
mix of these political articles with human interest stories, sports reports, music 
features, colorful photographs, and self-help features gave it a uniquely ‘universal 
character’ in the GDR’s media landscape.14  The magazine simply did not appear to 
citizens to be overtly political in nature and appealed to a broad range of them from 
a broad range of backgrounds. This appeal meant that, although books on crime and 
criminality penned by regime criminologists were available, citizens were far more 
likely to access the NBI than they were these dry academic tomes.15 
This article considers pieces published in the NBI from August 1961 until the
regime’s demise in 1989. During this period in which the inner-German border and 
the border between East and West Berlin were sealed (after the construction of the 
Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961), it was more difficult for the SED to argue 
convincingly (or citizens were less likely to believe) that, as the regime had often 
claimed before 1961, West German criminals were to blame for incidents of crime 
in the GDR. Every edition of the NBI published in this period was examined and 
approximately two hundred and thirty articles or commentaries about or referencing 
everyday crime were found and examined. To enable examination of the SED 
regime’s policy with regard to crime reporting in its media, as well as for evidence 
of the possible censorship of articles in the NBI, files relating to the public relations 
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Federal Archive in Berlin.
This article shows that the SED regime directed the media to attempt to 
shape citizens’ perceptions of crime to convince them that they were safe from 
criminality. The NBI communicated to citizens that crime rates were relatively low 
and persistently decreasing. The magazine and the state officials that appeared in its 
pages emphasized to readers that no serious crime occurred in the GDR. Reports 
focussed on instances of theft, while the NBI underreported or simply did not 
mention other crimes such as murder or rape (which the regime’s statistics showed 
did occur in not insignificant numbers). In contrast, the NBI portrayed the West as 
an inherently lawless society riddled from the top to the bottom with serious and 
violent crime. The SED regime thus instrumentalized the phenomenon of crime in 
its efforts to achieve the psychological delimitation (Abgrenzung) of its citizens from
the West. The magazine accordingly cast the Berlin Wall as a crime prevention 
measure which was keeping Western criminals out. The NBI did nevertheless 
provide citizens with reports of real-life instances of crime and therefore a fuller 
picture of criminality in the GDR than could be gleaned from the theoretical works 
of the state’s criminologists. 
This article is, however, not merely about which crimes the SED regime did 
or did not report to citizens and the details thereof. At the core of this examination of
articles about crime and criminality that appeared in the NBI is the issue of how the 
Party attempted to construct legitimacy in the minds of its citizens in order to win 
their consent and support. Perceiving that citizens were not enthused by socialism to 
the extent that it desired, the Party sought other sources of legitimacy.16 These 
included the state’s founding myth and definition of itself as antifascist, as well as its
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citizens.17 One can place the SED’s account of the phenomenon of criminality in this
array of the regime’s efforts to convince citizens that the socialist society that it had 
constructed was better than its Western capitalist counterpart. The Party 
communicated to citizens that (unlike in the capitalist West) crime was not a 
constitutive part of socialist society. Rather, it was an alien phenomenon growing 
like a weed on the fringe of the socialist garden and, like any other weed, its roots 
could be located and permanently killed off. Criminality was thus presented to 
citizens as a curable condition. The regime communicated to them that the only cure 
for the causes of crime was socialism. The only way that citizens could therefore 
apparently ensure that they and their property were safe and secure from criminality 
was to adopt, support and live according to the tenets of the socialist society that the 
SED had constructed, thereby legitimizing the Party’s project.
Organizer, propagandist, educator
Media reporting of crime in the GDR was consistent with the dominant ideology 
model put forward by critical criminologists, who usually apply this to capitalist 
systems. According to this model, the media’s portrayal of crime and law and order 
seeks to shape citizens’ perceptions of criminality in favor of and to win consent for 
the state and its policies, while also denigrating persons or groups designated as 
threats to state power. The media’s treatment of crime thus plays a key 
propagandistic role in confirming, consolidating and gaining acceptance of the 
dominant ideology of a regime or government.18 Following Leninist doctrine, the 
SED regime directed the press to be the partisan “organizer, propagandist and 
7educator” of the masses.19 The printed press thus served as the mouthpiece of the 
Party. The Ministry of the Interior directed the media’s reporting of crime in the 
GDR. Ministry officials responsible for public relations drew up annual programmes
of the subjects to be covered and sent out corresponding directives and 
information.20
State control of the printed press in the GDR was comprehensive.21 Editors 
and journalists did not enjoy free reign over their publications. From the founding of
the state in 1949 (and even after the advent of television), the Party directed the print
media through the Presseamt, which was attached to the Ministerrat, a body which 
effectively rubber-stamped the decisions made by the SED leadership.22 The 
Abteilung Lektorat/Lizenzen of the Presseamt granted print media publications 
permission to be published. This section monitored print media output to ensure that 
it kept in line with Party decrees.23 Essentially, publications and their contents were 
required to “fulfil the current requirements of socialist society”.24 According to the 
First Secretary and de facto leader of the SED Erich Honecker in 1983, this meant 
informing citizens continually of the achievements of the GDR in the areas of 
socialist democracy, social policy, education, culture, youth policy, and other key 
aspects of everyday life. Honecker directed the press to report on model experiences 
and results in order to encourage citizens to follow suit. Finally, Honecker 
emphasized that, wherever possible, these should be presented in stark contrast to 
the dismantling of the welfare state (Sozialabbau) in West Germany.25
Although officially no censorship of the press existed, the Party implemented
processes to ensure that the articles that appeared in the print media toed the line. 
The Abteilung Agitation of the Central Committee of the SED was responsible for 
steering the press. Chief Editors were required to provide this department with 
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detailed reports on the subjects that editors planned to cover.27 An SED Party 
Secretary would help editorial teams to draw up these plans.28 Once they received 
these plans, officials at the Abteilung Agitation would then stipulate changes to be 
made.29 Representatives of the regime also regularly convened meetings with media 
representatives in order to direct them. For example, in 1971 the GDR’s Attorney 
General, Dr Josef Streit, met with representatives of the state’s news publications 
(including the NBI) to discuss how they should deal with the subject of criminality. 
Streit ordered them to focus on “mobilizing the public’s sense of impatience and 
intolerance toward any type of criminal offence. ‘Looking the other way’ makes 
criminals’ work easier. Public opinion must be strengthened with regard to the 
notion that socialist law is unbreakable.”30 A year later, the Ministry of the Interior 
recorded that, in places where regional heads of the Volkspolizei had met with press 
representatives to direct the content of their articles, the police had apprehended 
more criminals because of the fact that citizens had been better informed about and 
“encouraged to show impatience” toward crime.31
Once approved, publications could be sent to press--but always several days 
before they were due to go on sale. This permitted the delivery of copies of the final 
print version to the Abteilung Agitation for final approval and left time for changes 
to be made.32 In special cases, articles might be forwarded to appropriate ministers 
or authorities for further scrutiny.33 This occurred in the case of one particular NBI 
article in 1974. The magazine sent a draft article about the reintroduction of young 
offenders into society to Oberstleutnant Twarog, head of the press/information 
section of the Ministry of the Interior. It sought his support for publication. The NBI 
explained that the article was about the successful reintegration into society of the 
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release and was now working on a collective farm. The NBI hoped to convince 
Twarog that the article showed the positive results of the GDR’s judiciary system.34 
The piece was passed onto Oberst Tunnst, head of the administration of correctional 
facilities. In a letter Tunnst advised Twarog that he had verbally communicated to 
the NBI that some corrections to the content of the piece were necessary. 
Unfortunately, he did not provide details of these in his correspondence. He did, 
however, reference several photographs accompanying the article that he wanted 
‘retouched’. Tunnst wanted visible stains on and damage to the inside walls of the 
institute to be removed. He asked that a picture be removed that showed no 
information notice board for prisoners on the wall. He also wanted a picture 
removed or adapted which showed a group of inmates, but with no guard present. 
Tunnst concluded by recommending that a Staatsanwalt should also examine the 
article before it could be published.35 
The fact that this article, despite its apparent positive political tone, was 
passed to Twarog, Tunnst and then to a Staatsanwalt demonstrates the dense system 
of checks involved in the publication process. This made spontaneous publication 
decisions and deviation from the plan nigh on impossible.36 Alterations were often 
only permitted when a rebuttal was urgently required to claims made by West 
German media or politicians.37 Post-publication scrutiny existed in the form of 
critical reports and meetings with the Presseamt. These ensured that the press 
continued to produce reports that (according to the regime) were “effective, socially 
significant and relevant.”38 Additionally, there were weekly meetings involving 
Chief Editors and the head of the Abteilung Agitation. At these Argumentations-
Sitzungen state officials commented on the week’s publications and offered editors 
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‘guidance’ for the coming weeks.39 In practice, this meant the distribution of lists of 
the latest taboo subjects or expressions.40 Publishing houses also maintained in-
house lists of politically sensitive subjects to avoid.41
 
Taking an axe to the root of crime
Friedrich Engels claimed that communists would “take an axe to the root of crime” 
and eliminate it completely as a phenomenon. The belief that criminality would 
eventually die out after the establishment of actually existing socialist societal 
conditions was central to the SED regime’s view of crime (see photograph two). In 
1985 Minister of the Interior and Head of the Volkspolizei Friedrich Dickel echoed in
an interview with the NBI the decades-old conclusion of the state criminologists 
that, although people were still committing criminal offences in the GDR, “crime 
has no future.”42 Yet what did not remain static was the regime’s explanation of why 
crime persisted. In the 1950s class theory dominated the state’s interpretation of 
criminality.43 According to this, class differences were the main reason that led 
people to commit criminal offences.44 The concept of private property apparently 
created “unproductive, destructive conflict” between citizens, which manifested 
itself in multiple forms of “criminality such as theft, assault, sex offences and 
murder.”45  The construction of socialism in the GDR in the 1950s ought thus to 
eliminate the main causes of crime and the majority of crime itself by the end of the 
decade.46 Once this proved not to be the case, the state and its criminologists sought 
other explanations.
In 1965, the NBI recounted the police career to date of Major Alex W., a 





to the SED regime
(“Verbrechen ohne Chance,”
NBI, 27/1965).
inception in 1945.47 Major W. stated that “to stamp out criminality altogether cannot 
be done quickly” because citizens needed to be educated to adopt different mind-sets
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regarding crime. 48 He claimed that once citizens had learned to think and behave in 
new ways, crime would cease to exist, the Volkspolizei would become superfluous 
and its files given over to an archive.49 This alludes to the “relict theory” promoted 
by the SED regime’s criminologists in the 1960s and which shaped criminological 
thinking in the GDR.50 At the core of this concept was the assertion that everyday 
criminality constituted a “birthmark” or a “relict” from the old capitalist society.51 
Citizens were gripped by the “psychological heritage of the past.”52 This took the 
form of “specific conditions, relationships, views and thought patterns” whose origin
lay in “the material, psychological and moral imperfections of the life which the old 
bourgeois society has bequeathed to us.”53 The SED regime’s Attorney General Dr 
Josef Streit stated in an interview with the NBI in 1966 that, although the 
construction of a socialist society meant that the “socio-economic basis of crime” 
had been removed, this did not mean that crime would instantly disappear. Streit 
stated that “old inherited perceptions and habits” would persist for a long period. 
Crime would apparently still occur because “individual citizens were lagging behind
the quickly advancing societal development”. Streit expressed similar sentiments 
two years later when he stated: “new, socialist ways of behaving do not follow 
automatically from the new socio-economic basic structure of our society”.54 The 
“relict theory” thus reframed criminality as a pedagogical rather than a societal 
problem.55 Once citizens had been educated to the required extent and had developed
a new “socialist personality”, they would realize that there was no reason to commit 
crime.56 
Despite the fact that the “relict theory” never lost its prominent place as the 
central principle of the SED’s regime’s theory on the causes of crime in the GDR, 
reference to it rarely appeared in the pages of the NBI after 1968. This reflects 
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contemporary adjustments made to the theory by state criminologists.57 These were 
necessary because of the fact that, even though the regime claimed that socialist 
societal relations were being stabilized, consolidated and strengthened in the 1970s 
and 1980s, crime persisted and in some periods increased dramatically.58 State 
criminologists coined the term “contradiction approach” (Widerspruchsansatz) to 
describe their examination of the circumstances or contradictions between theory 
and reality in GDR society that triggered citizens’ expression of the “psychological 
heritage of the past.”59 
The readers of the NBI learned that the vast majority of these contradictions 
were due to internal influences or circumstances within GDR society, showing 
readers that crime was actually home-grown. Only three articles made a link 
between Western influence and crime. In 1972, the NBI questioned the upbringing 
of eight young men standing trial for assault. The magazine asked why it had never 
occurred to their parents to stop their sons from watching or listening to the West 
German media.60 In 1983, a photograph showed the apartment walls of a burglar 
covered with Elvis Presley posters (see photograph three).61 Six years later, Attorney
General Günter Wendland stated in an interview that “a few young people, for 
example, so-called Skinheads, fall under the influence of Western examples and 
commit violence or other offences.”62 The reporting in the NBI also reveals a gap 
between official policy and what occurred on the ground. Although the state’s 
criminologists did shift their attention to possible internal causes of crime, they 
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3. Inside a criminal’s apartment (“Täter ermittelt,” NBI, 26/1983, 16-19).
nevertheless continued to make much of the role played by the activities of the 
“imperialist West”.63 Furthermore, in the early 1970s the regime advised the media 
that there was a link between “imperialist ideological diversion” and crime. It 
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directed the mass media to “create an offensive and clear image of the enemy 
(Feindbild)” in order to encourage “intolerant and partisan behavior toward 
capitalist ideologies and patterns of behavior.”64 The regime’s perception of the 
potential influence of the West was not unfounded. The Party was more than aware 
that the majority of its citizens accessed the West German broadcast media and that 
its clumsy, unpopular and unsuccessful attempts to stop this (including tearing down 
television aerials pointing westwards in 1961) had failed miserably.65
Articles about crime in the NBI suggested to readers several reasons for the 
existence and persistence of the phenomenon in the GDR. The magazine reported on
what it termed the “bad moral circumstances” in the familial backgrounds of 
criminals that led them to commit offences. These were given as the main reason 
why offenders committed serious crime in the town of Riesa in 1968.66 In 1971, 
fifteen-year-old Bernd stole money in order to move out of the home where his step-
father was beating him.67 A year later, the NBI accused the parents of a gang of eight
young men standing trial for assault of neglecting their responsibilities and “hoping 
that somehow everything would turn out for the best.”68 In 1980, the NBI cited the 
“difficulties” in the parental relationships of six young men charged with football 
hooliganism, assault, and theft.69 Three years later the magazine highlighted the fact 
that Andreas J.’s early life had been disrupted by living with his grandparents and 
then his twice-married father in a report on his habit of robbing and destroying 
payphones.70 In 1988, the NBI again cited the fractured home life of several 
offenders who had committed vandalism.71 The focus on the familial backgrounds of
offenders and the role that these played in their development into criminals was in 
line with later advances in GDR criminology. State criminologists focussed more 
and more on the individual personality traits and development of criminal 
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offenders.72 The link that these articles made between the poor quality of a citizen’s 
family life and their development into a criminal also reflected state policy toward 
the family unit. The regime viewed the family as the smallest cell of the socialist 
collective. Its “moral and educational” role was enshrined in law in 1965 through the
Law on the Unified Socialist Education System. A good family unit, above all, was 
key to citizens’ development of a “socialist personality.”73 It was for this reason that 
the NBI often berated parents for not realizing that they were not just bringing up 
children, but also socialist citizens.74
In many of the criminal cases and commentaries featured the NBI made clear
that the inebriation or regular excessive alcohol consumption of an offender had led 
them to commit their crime. Alcohol consumption and rates of alcoholism were 
consistently and relatively extremely high in the GDR. By 1989 citizens were 
annually consuming a vast amount of beer and spirits. In the latter years of the 1980s
the average East German drank an extraordinary 23 bottles of spirits per year, with 
an estimated one in every eight citizens being an alcoholic in 1987.75 Since the mid-
1960s, the SED had recognized that growing alcohol consumption was linked to 
criminality.76 In interviews with the NBI, both Attorney General Streit and Minister 
of the Interior Dickel cited crime inspired by drunkenness as a problem area in their 
fight against criminality.77 It seemed that a bit of “Dutch courage” was all that was 
needed for some citizens to commit a criminal offence, The regime’s plan to tackle 
this was to communicate via the press the consequences of such actions.78 The NBI 
therefore linked the excessive alcohol consumption of Joachim P. (“Twenty half-litre
bottles of beer per day”) to the fact that he has become a serial burglar.79 Alcohol 
also apparently played a role in the descent of Norbert S. into criminality, 
culminating in his theft of antiques from a church.80 Two men also apparently 
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vandalized and ransacked their former school while drunk in 1985.81 The NBI also 
underscored the effect that excessive alcohol consumption by a family member of 
the offender had on the latter. In 1984, readers learned that the father of fifteen-year-
old offender Mike S. often came home drunk and disrupted the family’s life. This led
Mike to give up on school and become friends with Andreas O., who ultimately led 
him astray. The NBI commented: “The development of Mike S. once more makes 
clear the catastrophic effects on children when alcohol is king in the family.”82 
Similarly, Manuela’s mother drank and regularly beat her daughter, leading Manuela
to skip school, hang around the streets and steal money.83 The hard-drinking husband
of Ilona M. offered her no support when she was released from prison for the fourth 
time. She went on to reoffend, committing an astonishing sixty-three burglaries in 
Dresden.84 
In 1968, the article ‘Meister G. und unser Recht’ suggested that the SED 
regime’s programme of the rapid industrialization and expansion of urban areas had 
led to criminality in those areas. The article recounted the experiences of crime of 
foreman G. who worked in a factory in the town of Riesa in the district of Dresden. 
In Riesa, crime had apparently only decreased by two percent, whereas the national 
average had been twenty-three. To explain this, G. made a direct link to the 
industrial expansion of the town, as well as the surrounding agricultural area. This 
industrialization had required an influx of new workers and the population of Riesa 
had risen from 36,303 inhabitants in 1959 to 43,125 in 1966. G. called this “a 
process, which must be taken into account when looking at criminality calculations.”
The article indicated that the more or less unchanging crime rate in Riesa was 
because of the fact that many of the new workers were young men, living away from
home for the first time and in a “strange environment that they cannot get to grips 
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with.”85 High levels of crime in newly industrialized or expanded areas were not just
a problem in Riesa. The GDR’s economy could not keep pace with the Party’s 
promise of new utopian towns filled with modern housing and amenities. With 
regard to older dwellings, the state simply could not keep up with the level of 
renovation needed. In Dresden in 1980, for example, only forty-four percent of older
flats and houses had hot running water. Housing estates and satellite towns built to 
house workers and their families were jokingly compared to ghettos. The disparity 
between the SED’s promises and reality was clear for all to see. Dissatisfaction and 
disgruntlement among citizens led crime rates to soar above the national average in 
towns and cities with ‘new town’ residential areas, such as Eisenhüttenstadt, 
Schwedt and Halle.86 
A number of articles recounting instances of theft to readers did not cite any 
particular political, social or alcohol-related reasons for the crime. Instead, they 
simply blamed citizens’ own carelessness in looking after their property. Readers 
were warned that opportunists were liable to take advantage of open windows or 
unlocked cars.87 The magazine exclaimed its exasperation at the fact that no one 
apparently bothered to chain their bicycle up.88 It reprimanded citizens and described
the extent to which Volkspolizei officers were dismayed by the fact that their job was
being made much harder.89 A team of NBI journalists even stole pipes in broad 
daylight from a building site in 1973 to demonstrate how easy it was. They lamented
the fact that no “attentive citizen” had tried to stop them and concluded: “Should 
theft be this easy?”90
Examination of articles about crime or criminality published in the NBI in 
the 1970s and 1980s shows a sea change in the magazine’s discourse on the causes 
of crime in the GDR. In this period the regime directed the NBI to focus on 
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offenders’ “asociality” as the main cause of their criminal behavior.91 This term had 
appeared in German law since the time of the Kaiserreich to denote criminal 
transgression.92 The Nazis later employed it to justify their murderous extermination 
of “undesirable” people.93 Given the use of this term during the Third Reich, it is 
interesting that the SED also chose to employ it to refer to people displaying 
“undesirable” behavior and/or personality traits, even if the consequences for those 
labeled “asocial” in the Third Reich and the GDR were starkly different.94 The SED 
regime defined the fight against crime as “a fight against asocial manners of 
behavior.”95 In the 1950s, the regime had applied the term “asocial” to so-called 
class enemies still existent in the GDR, such as private business owners or farmers 
resisting the pressure to collectivize. After the almost complete eradication of such 
groups in the 1960s, the regime’s new penal code of 1968 defined “asocial citizens” 
in the context of their willingness to work.96 Those who neither worked nor wanted 
to (despite being able to do so) and who earned income in other “unseemly” or 
illegal ways fell into this category.97 Indeed, in 1981 state prosecutor Peter 
Przybylski stated in an interview with the NBI that the road to “asociality” began 
with failing to turn up for work.98 In the same year the magazine concluded its 
account of a man stealing from churches with the question: “Why spoil your life by 
not working?”99 In a another piece, the magazine described the thieves Frank S. and 
Frank P. as two lazy, workshy men who wanted to “live off others.”100 In practice, 
the Party also categorized as “asocial” any citizen whom it deemed not to be living 
according to the rules, norms and morals of socialist society.101 According to a 
booklet about criminality in the GDR produced by the SED specifically to help the 
press to write their articles the “development of asocial offenders is marred by 
alcohol abuse, disturbing the peace, leaving school or apprenticeships, frequently 
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changing jobs, low education level, primitive free-time requirements.”102 The SED 
was extremely suspicious of such citizens. It perceived that they were more difficult 
to observe and control because they were not participating correctly in the socialist 
project. In other words, they were not following the Party’s orders.103 In 1981, the 
NBI portrayed as “asocial” the crew of a pleasure cruiser who were overcharging 
their guests and pocketing the excess.104 It bemoaned the fact that a woman had 
committed fraud and, in so doing, had rejected the “merits of socialism: respect, 
camaraderie, readiness to help others and trust.”105 In another piece, a group of 
thieves who were stealing and selling fruit were accused of “throwing honesty and 
awareness of responsibility--these obvious requirements of our social coexistence--
overboard’.106 
The Party’s categorization of criminals as “asocial” allowed it to explain the 
activities of criminal offenders who had been born, raised and socialized in the GDR
and had nevertheless turned to crime.107 It also enabled explanation of serious 
incidents of crime which “for a citizen of our country are difficult to understand”, 
such as the vandalism of a Jewish cemetery in Prenzlauer Berg, East Berlin, in 1988.
A group of youths had defaced and damaged 222 headstones with “fascist” slogans, 
while also shouting anti-Semitic abuse, because they apparently believed that this 
was what it meant “to be German.” Yet the magazine did not address these issues at 
all, focusing instead on what state psychologists claimed was the perpetrators’ “total 
lack of emotional bonds” and “lack of sense of social responsibility and 
determination of the will.” The NBI reported that, as opposed to West German Neo 
Nazis, it was these “deficiencies” that led them to commit their crime and not any 
kind of belief in fascist ideology, nationalism or anti-Semitism. The magazine stated 
that, under the influence of West German propaganda, they had used the 
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“glorification of fascism” as a crutch for their asocial behavior. It concluded that the 
offenders had “placed themselves on the outskirts of a society in which religious and
racial hatred constituted serious crimes.”108 On another occasion the NBI 
philosophically concluded that “it is unfortunately often the case that people do not 
act according to logic’ and make a conscious decision to commit a crime.”109 The 
apparent rejection of socialism, its norms and morals by such citizens was simply 
not “normal”. They were “aliens” in GDR society who were in desperate need of 
“re-education.”110 Once these citizens were identified, apprehended and ‘re-educated’
their careers in crime (and crime itself) would come to an end.
“Mere petty offences”
The articles on crime and criminality published in the NBI communicated clearly to 
readers that crime was consistently decreasing in the GDR. The magazine often 
supported this claim by referring to the regime’s official statistics, which always 
showed readers that the crime rate had dropped compared with previous years.111 In 
1978, Attorney General Streit proudly stated that crime had decreased from highs of 
approximately half a million offences in the immediate post-war years to an annual 
average of 120,000.112 There is no doubt that the regime manipulated the official 
crime rate statistics. Yet there is a dearth of recent research on the actual crime rate. 
Investigations carried out soon after Germany’s reunification suggested that the 
crime rate in the GDR had actually been three times higher than the official figure.113
The attentive NBI reader might also have concluded that the statistics did not reveal 
the actual extent of crime. In an interview with the NBI in 1967, Minister of the 
Interior Dickel explicitly stated that petty offences (Ordnungswidrigkeiten) 
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punishable with fines were not included in the statistics.114 A year later, the NBI ran 
a series of eight columns in which State Prosecutor Helmuth Rutsch explained the 
regime’s new penal code to readers. Rutsch explained that many petty crimes (for 
example, theft of property worth under fifty marks) were to be decriminalized and 
categorized as Verfehlungen (misconduct). A pie chart (without indication of actual 
percentages) showed readers that eighty to ninety percent of all instances of criminal
offences before 1968 in the GDR were actually Verfehlungen or “mere petty 
offences” as Rutsch put it.115 As such, from 1968 the regime did not include them in 
the official crime statistics, keeping them artificially low.
Yet despite the proclaimed low level of crime, NBI interviews with 
authorities on criminality suggest that the regime was dissatisfied with the rate at 
which crime was decreasing. Attorney General Streit lamented in 1966 the 
“stagnation” in the GDR’s crime rate since 1958.116 The following year, Minister of 
the Interior Dickel also alluded to crime rates that were stable, but not decreasing.117 
And in 1968, Streit informed readers with reference to the crime rate that “mastering
criminality is, to be frank, a complicated and protracted process.”118 The figures do 
show that the extent by which crime was reducing each year was gradually slowing. 
The average number of recorded offences in the 1960s was approximately 15 
percent lower than the average number recorded in the 1950s. The average number 
of recorded crimes in the 1970s was, however, only approximately 6 percent lower 
than the level in the 1960s. The average number of recorded offences in the 1980s 
was only approximately 4.6 percent lower than the average in the 1970s. The 
published statistics even showed that in several periods recorded crimes increased 
from one year to the next. For example, in 1979, 2,479 more offences were recorded 
than in the previous year (129,099 in 1979 as opposed to 126,620 in 1978). The 
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number of recorded crimes increased again in 1980, though this time only by 171 
offences.119 Moreover, in July 1989, Attorney General Günter Wendland admitted in 
the NBI that crime had recently increased. He qualified this by stating that the 
number of criminal offences had decreased over the last ten years.120 Despite these 
admissions the regime was not prepared to publish statistics that showed dramatic 
increases in crime. Such was the increase in recorded criminal offences between 
1971 and 1977 (perhaps because of Erich Honecker’s crackdown on crime in the 
early years of his reign, resulting in more crimes being detected and recorded121), 
that no related statistics were published in the GDR in these years.122
As well as using statistics to attempt to persuade readers that crime was not a
serious problem in the GDR, the language employed by the NBI to describe criminal
offences also underplayed their severity. The magazine’s terminology 
communicated to readers that no serious and/or violent crimes occurred in the GDR. 
It did not employ the word Verbrechen--a term meaning “crime”, but with 
connotations of violence, abhorrence and reprehensibility--to describe criminal 
offences that took place in the GDR. Instead, terms appeared that were more neutral 
and lacking undertones of serious and/or violent crime. These included Kriminalität 
(criminality), Straftaten (criminal offences), Delikte (offences), 
Ordnungswidrigkeiten (petty offences), Vergehen (misdemeanors), Übertretungen 
(transgressions) and the aforementioned Verfehlungen (misconduct). Similarly, the 
NBI did not employ the term Verbrecher (criminal who commits Verbrechen) to 
describe the perpetrators of crimes in the GDR. Instead, these were Täter 
(perpetrators), Straffällige (offenders), Rechtsbrecher (lawbreakers), Verurteilten 
(the sentenced people), Langfinger (pilferers) or unredliche Mitbürger (dishonest 
fellow citizens). Otherwise, perpetrators were referred to according to the crime they
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had committed, such as Dieb (thief) or Rowdy (hooligan). The terms Verbrechen and
Verbrecher only appeared in the NBI in relation to crime in the GDR when the 
magazine cited types of criminal offence (such as bank robbery, drug smuggling, 
kidnapping and people trafficking) that did not and could not occur in the socialist 
society that the SED had constructed.123 
With regard to the offences that were committed in the GDR, the NBI left 
readers in no doubt that theft of property (Eigentumsdelikt) was the most common. 
Of the articles published in the NBI addressing crime and criminality, the majority 
featured or alluded to instances of stealing. These pieces ranged from the extreme 
example of Gerhard W. to readers’ letters to the NBI’s “Dein Recht” legal advice 
column about witnessing theft in their local supermarket.124 Leading regime 
criminologists also acknowledged the problem of theft in the pages of the NBI. In an
interview in 1966 Attorney General Streit explicitly identified theft as a main focus 
for the law enforcement authorities.125 Twelve years later, he stated that instances 
thereof accounted for half of all the crimes committed.126 This focus on theft 
reflected the regime’s official data which showed that this offence accounted for 
between forty and fifty percent of all annually recorded crimes. Yet the magazine’s 
emphasis on this offence also mirrored reality in the GDR and other countries in the 
Eastern Bloc.127 One survey conducted with citizens of Czechoslovakia in 1988 
found that 598 of the 600 interviewed occasionally, regularly or frequently procured 
items illegally. This high level of stealing across the Eastern Bloc led to the creation 
of “informal” or “shadow” economies in which stolen goods were exchanged or 
sold, costing the communist regimes millions in lost tax revenues.128 The apparent 
epidemic scale of theft in the GDR has been attributed to the country’s “economy of 
scarcity” (Mangelwirtschaft).129 Kelly Hignett also found in oral history interviews 
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with formers citizens of Czechoslovakia that many of them had taken up a life of 
crime in order to maintain some semblance of a decent standard of living. Ironically,
one interviewee even claimed that the living conditions created by communism led 
people to become criminals. Moreover, many interviewees stated that they had 
started to steal things because so many people were doing it and it had become 
socially acceptable. Only very few of Hignett’s interviewees stated that they 
regarded stealing as an act of opposition, a way to “fight back”, and a means of 
“getting one over on the communists.”130 Yet stealing in the GDR was not simply 
problematic for the SED regime because it meant that citizens were less secure and 
safe. The many cases in which public property was stolen also suggested to the Party
that a large amount of citizens rejected the concept of socialist property. In other 
words, the SED had failed to convince citizens that, as the NBI put it, they were 
“socialist co-owners” (sozialistische Miteigentümer) effectively stealing from 
themselves.131 
Many of the instances of theft recounted in the pages of the NBI involved 
citizens stealing from places such as supermarkets or unlocked cars. Yet the 
magazine also featured several pieces which focused on theft from the workplace. 
Theft from the workplace--particularly of construction materials and tools-- was 
widespread in the GDR. In 1986, Judge Anneli Krömke told the NBI that work tools
were one of the items most often pilfered in the GDR.132 In 1984 alone the SED 
regime calculated that approximately 778,000 Marks worth of tools and/or materials 
had been stolen from the workplace.133 Considering, however, the extent of this type 
of theft in the GDR, the NBI rarely thematized it. The magazine directly addressed it
in only five pieces between 1961 and 1989. These articles often made clear that 
individuals stole from their workplaces in order to make private profit or gain. One 
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man was siphoning fruit from the store where he worked and selling it on.134 Another
man stole money from his factory in order to earn “a second salary”.135 In 1986, two 
brothers took materials from the construction firm where they worked in order to 
build a summer house in their garden.136 Only on one occasion did an article hint that
citizens were stealing from their workplaces because they could not procure the 
items they needed any other way. In 1965, two young men went on trial in 1965 for 
stealing motorbike parts to repair their vehicles.137 Yet it was often due to the fact 
that materials and parts were in such short supply in the GDR that many citizens did 
resort to stealing from their workplace.138 
In reaction to high levels of theft the SED directed the media to focus on this 
area of criminality.139 With specific regard to the offence of theft, publications were 
to “use their influence to promote respect for socialist law in all areas of societal 
life.”140 Yet in practice the NBI advised readers on how to prevent their property 
from being stolen, rather than focusing on how to prevent their readers from 
becoming thieves. NBI journalists recounted their theft of bicycles around Berlin 
(which proved to be “child’s play”) to show readers how to make their possessions 
secure.141 On a separate occasion, journalists stole pipes in broad daylight from a 
building site and presented readers with other case studies of specific thefts to show 
them how these crimes might have been prevented.142 In another article a 
Volkspolizist claimed to often see situations in which citizens’ “endanger” their own 
property by leaving windows open or doors unlocked. 143 These articles suggest a 
tacit acceptance on the part of the regime that, if given the opportunity, thieves 
would strike. This apparent pessimism was well-founded, as the SED did not 
succeed in significantly reducing the level of theft in the GDR. This was made clear 
to NBI readers in 1986 when Judge Anneli Krömke commented that stealing was 
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still the most commonly committed criminal offence. She did qualify her utterances, 
however, by stating that the majority of the property stolen was not worth more than 
1000 Marks.144 
Compared to the number of articles recounting instances of theft, reports of 
serious and/or violent crime such as murder, assault with a deadly weapon or rape 
appeared in the pages of the NBI extremely rarely. In fact, only two such articles 
were published in the period between 1961 and 1989. Such infrequent reporting 
belies the fact that the regime’s published statistics show that these types of crime 
did happen and not in insignificant number. The official rates of murder and rape in 
this period hovered between approximately 110 and 130 cases per year and six to 
seven hundred cases per year respectively.145 Laura Bradley has found that the 
underreporting of serious crime in the media displeased the Volkspolizei, who felt 
that such reporting might make citizens complacent regarding the issue. The fact that
the media were evidently able to ignore to a great extent the wishes of the 
Volkspolizei suggests another gap in the regime’s control of the press.146
The first of these articles featuring a violent crime was a report on the sexual 
assault of an eleven-year-old girl in a small town in Brandenburg in 1967, a crime 
which the NBI described as a “very rare occurrence for us.” To emphasize this, the 
magazine did employ the term Verbrechen this time. The article focussed, however, 
neither on the crime, nor the perpetrator and it did not recount the regime’s 
interpretation of sex crimes as a result of citizens’ own failure to learn or adhere to 
the norms promoted by socialist society.147 Instead, the article demonstrated to 
readers what could be achieved if all citizens worked together to fight crime. It 
praised the “thousands across the GDR who mobilized to join the hunt for the 
perpetrator.” After recounting how a tip off from a passer-by finally led the police to 
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their man, the article concluded that the Volkspolizei investigation would not have 
been nearly as successful without the “dynamic help of many of our citizens.”148 
Thirteen years later, the NBI published its one and only report of the murder 
of a GDR citizen by a fellow GDR citizen. This recounted the killing of pensioner 
Elsa B. by a burglar in Leipzig. There was nothing in the files relating to the NBI to 
suggest a reason as to why a murder report suddenly appeared in the magazine. The 
official murder rate statistics also show no particular spike in the years 1979 and 
1980. Unusually for these articles, the NBI recounted this crime in graphic detail. 
Elsa B. had apparently been “severely strangled” and “broken ribs indicated that the 
perpetrator had knelt on her. He had also hit her on the head with a ‘blunt’ object.” A
photograph of Elsa’s body lying on the floor of her flat even accompanied the text, 
albeit with her face distorted to hide her identity (see photograph four). Later in the 
piece, the perpetrator Joachim P. confesses to killing Elsa B., graphically describing 
how he had strangled her until she collapsed, and carried on doing so while she was 
on the floor, pinning her down with his knees. He then made sure that she was dead 
by hitting her with a hammer that he found in a drawer in the flat. Despite the 
unusually detailed nature of this account, there was nothing unusual about how the 
NBI explained the killer’s motive. Joachim P. was “asocial”. He had never shown 
any interest in working, preferring to drink twenty bottles of beer a day instead.149 
There was a marked increase in the 1980s of NBI articles reporting on the 
“informal economy.” Only one of these had appeared in previous decades, 
suggesting that up to this point the SED regime was loath to acknowledge its 
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4. The body of Elsa B. (“Tatort vierter Stock,”
NBI,
26/1980, 8-11, 42-43)
existence publicly.150 Although the regime’s official statistics show no particular 
spike in economic crime in the 1980s, the publication of such articles indicates the 
regime’s growing concern about this type of crime. In 1981, readers learned of the 
crew of a pleasure cruiser who were overcharging their guests and pocketing the 
excess.151 The following year a woman stood accused of selling nineteen cars to her 
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friends, family and work colleagues which she could not supply.152 In the same year, 
a man was accused of setting up his own home business selling protective gloves for
manual workers.153 In two separate articles in 1989, a bookkeeper and a married 
couple were tried for defrauding their workplaces of thousands of Marks.154 The fact 
that a number of articles featuring this type of crime appeared at a time when the 
GDR’s economy was stagnating and headed for bankruptcy suggests a link between 
the health of the state’s economy and the discourse on crime and criminality that 
appeared in the press.155 Indeed, in the 1982 article about the illegal glove-seller, the 
NBI was more outraged by the fact that the man had not paid tax on his illegal 
earnings than the fact that he had set up a private business. The magazine exclaimed:
“We finance a considerable portion of our living standard with tax money. House 
building, education, medical provision, price subsidies for groceries and much more 
comes out of the ‘big pot’.”156 In the economically healthier times of the 1960s and 
1970s state directives to the press about which areas of criminality to cover had not 
featured this type of crime. 
As well as addressing crimes committed in the GDR and their perpetrators, the 
Volkspolizei and its officers, often appeared in articles about criminality in the 
NBI.157 The magazine published the majority of these pieces in celebration of the 
Tag der Volkspolizei (Day of the People’s Police) on July 1 each year. On this date, 
parades, speeches and awards ceremonies commemorated the founding of the state’s
police force. Yet the presence of the Volkspolizei was also implicit in many other 
articles about criminal acts, for no pieces ever appeared about unsolved crime in the 
GDR. The Volkspolizei (at least in the pages of the NBI) always got its man or 
woman. In fact, the regime directed the press to communicate the competency, 
efficacy and success of the Volkspolizei in protecting citizens and their property and 
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making them safe from crime.158 Accordingly, the NBI portrayed the investigations 
of the GDR’s police force as “painstaking”159, “tireless”160 or “arduous.”161 Texts 
focussed on the modern means and technologies at the police’s disposal: “Letters 
and documents can be investigated, dactyloscopic imprints evaluated, blood groups 
determined and hairs compared. Forensic traces are analysed and fibres investigated.
The scientists can scientifically investigate any trace, no matter how small” (see 
photograph five).162 Officers helped witness to identify perpetrators with the aid of 
“eight different body shapes, 60 noses, 276 pairs of eyes, 336 hairstyles, 180 
mouths, diverse ears, beards, glasses and hats.”163 In one instance, the Volkspolizei 
identified a burglar by the ear print he had left behind while eavesdropping at a 
door.164 
Yet most striking about the articles in which the Volkspolizei explicitly 
featured is the fact that they focused on the non-criminal incidents encountered by 
officers and emphasized the banality of their everyday routine. They thus suggested 
to readers that investigation and prevention of criminal offences did not constitute 
the majority of the work of the Volkspolizei and downplayed the extent and 
seriousness of criminality in the GDR. Articles gave the distinct impression that the 
life of a Volkspolizist consisted mainly of the following tasks: traffic control165, 
administering first aid, looking for missing children, escorting blood donors to 
hospitals166
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5. A forensic scientist of the Volkspolizei at work. (“Tatort  vierter Stock,“ 
NBI, 26/1980, 8-11, 42-43)
near rivers, giving talks to school pupils167, and, for certain specialist officers, 
diffusing unexploded bombs.168 Police work was usually “without sensation.”169 
One might explain the apparent ordinariness of the police officer’s work 
expressed in these articles as a result of the regime’s claim that “There are no career 
criminals here, no drug scene, no raids on the underworld. It is not a detective 
story.”170 The Party also directed the press, however, to focus on the personalities of 
the police officers featured in the articles, rather than their work. The regime was 
most concerned about presenting citizens with representations of members of the 
Volkspolizei who were “nice, trustworthy, selfless, courageous, clever, friendly and 
willing to help.”171 Consequently, photographs showed police officers having 
friendly chats with civilians and letting children play with their caps (see photograph
six).172 Officers were to remind citizens of people they might actually know and 
therefore to whom they could relate. The regime perceived that citizens were more 
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likely to accept the authority of the police (and, by extension, the state) if officers 
appeared to them to be human beings, rather than faceless representatives of the 
regime.173 Representations of the Volkspolizei thus served to strengthen citizens’ 
confidence in the system.174 To this end, the SED also directed the press to present 
readers with accounts of “genuinely humorous, original situations” in which the 
Volkspolizei were involved.175 Consequently, officers appeared in the NBI 
attempting to round up an escaped cow176, or a monkey and two bison which had 
escaped from Leipzig zoo, or being bitten by the dog of a woman whom they had 
found collapsed.177 Humorous poems or caricatures of the Volkspolizei occasionally 
also appeared (see photograph seven).178
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6. “Five minutes of fun” with a friendly officer of the Volkspolizei (“Alltag
ohne Stationen,” NBI, 26/1973, 39).
7. Caricature of a day in the life of the
Volkspolizei
(“Berlin intim”, NBI, 27/1970, 38-9)
“Since we have no open borders anymore, crime has decreased”
In the early hours of Sunday, 13 August 1961, the GDR’s security forces sealed the 
inner-German border and erected barbed wire fences that would become the Berlin 
Wall along the sector boundary between East and West Berlin. The SED regime took
this measure to stem the vast tide of citizens leaving the GDR to escape the 
repressive regime and poor living conditions. On the front page of the Party’s 
national newspaper, Neues Deutschland, citizens were, however, offered a different 
explanation. The SED stated that the borders had been sealed as part of a 
‘crackdown on enemy activity undertaken by the revanchist and militarist forces in 
West Germany and West Berlin’ in order to prevent the ‘fascist imperialist’ forces in 
Bonn from triggering a civil war.179 According to the SED the protection of the GDR
and its self-preservation lay at the heart of the actions taken in August 1961. This 
point was underscored later that year when Politbüro member Horst Sindermann 
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referred to the nascent Berlin Wall as the “Antifascist Defence Rampart” 
(antifaschistischer Schutzwall). For the following 28 years of the Wall’s existence, 
the SED used this moniker whenever it referred to the border regime in Berlin. Only 
in 1989 did Erich Honecker refer to the border in Berlin using the German word for 
“wall” (Mauer) for the first time.180
In the weeks and months that followed the sealing of the borders, the NBI 
published several articles that echoed the official Party line. According to the 
magazine the Party had taken the “measures” of August 13, 1961, for the “protection
of peace and the security of GDR citizens.”181 “Revanchist politicians and agents of 
militarism” would no longer be permitted to enter the GDR. Mayor of West Berlin 
Willy Brandt had apparently seen “his hopes for murder and war dashed on August 
13” and Director of the Federal Chancellery Hans Globke’s “rats and voles” no 
longer had a foothold in East Berlin, where “the air must remain clean.”182 The world
“ought to breathe out” now that the SED had “spoiled the devilish plan” of the West 
to continue to threaten world peace.183 Yet although there were GDR citizens who 
immediately welcomed the construction of the Berlin Wall and who saw it as a 
necessary measure to protect their country, many others questioned the logic of the 
Party’s explanation of the new border controls. One Berliner wondered why, if the 
Wall was meant to keep “Western fascists” out, the border guards stood at the 
Brandenburg Gate with their weapons trained on the East German side of the 
border.184 In the years that followed it became clear to the regime that the majority of
citizens rejected its claims about the necessity of the Wall in preventing Western 
invasion.185 No amount of scaremongering about a Third World War or the rollback 
of the GDR could overcome in citizens’ mind the ever-present sense of boundaries 
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and the denial of rights that the Wall created.186 Citizens’ lives became consciously 
and subconsciously infused by the fact that they were living with partition and the 
Berlin Wall’s potency as a symbol of this cannot be underestimated.187 
Articles about or referencing the Berlin Wall that appeared in the NBI from 
1962 to 1989 indicate that, in light of the fact that a large number of citizens rejected
its official account of 13 August 1961, the SED attempted to recast the Berlin Wall 
in the minds of citizens as a bulwark against crime and criminality. That is not to say
that articles ceased to speak of the “Antifascist Defence Rampart” as the “savior of 
world peace.” They most certainly did not.188 Yet the NBI emphasized the Wall’s role
in crime prevention more and more, not only to demonstrate to citizens that the 
regime was taking measures to ensure their safety from criminality, but also to 
convince them that the existence of the Berlin Wall was vital to such efforts. As 
such, the pieces attempted to ‘normalize’ its presence in the eyes of citizens.189 
Articles emphasized to readers that the Wall and the secured inner-German border 
were preventing West German criminals from committing crimes in the GDR. For 
example, in 1962 the Wall protected the capital of the GDR from the “fury” of a 
group of “rampaging” young West Berliners who had allegedly been stirred up into 
frenzy by Willy Brandt.190 Similarly, in 1966 the NBI made clear that the Wall was 
keeping West German criminals out of the East.191 Other pieces informed readers 
about the apparent state of criminality before the borders were closed. In 1965, this 
theme dominated the article “Verbrechen ohne Chance” (“Crime has no chance”), 
which appeared across six editions of the NBI (covering a total of twenty-one pages)
in celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Volkspolizei. In this
piece Major Alex W. of the Volkspolizei cited extensively examples of Western 
criminal activity that took place in the GDR before the SED sealed its borders, 
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commenting that “the borders were open and more than a few criminals used this to 
their advantage. As long as the border was open, a whole range of crimes developed 
in Berlin.” For example, Major W. recalled an organized group of criminals based in 
West Berlin who were stealing scrap metal, lead piping, copper cables and other 
metal products from East Berlin. Major W. mentioned other examples of what he 
calls “illegal exports”--lenses, typewriters, and cameras.192 He concluded that the 
construction of the Berlin Wall put a stop to such incidents because “we closed the 
door on the thirteenth. Since we don’t have any open borders anymore, criminality 
has decreased even further.”193 In a later article Lieutenant-General Gerhard Lorenz, 
deputy commander of the GDR’s border guards, also recalled the state of affairs 
before the border was closed, citing as an example the fact that between July 1948 
and July 1949 alone 2,418 West German criminals were apprehended at the still 
open border.194
As well as preventing criminals from entering the GDR, the Wall also 
apparently prevented them from leaving the country too, enabling the state’s security
forces to apprehend them and thereby increasing the regime’s effectiveness in 
keeping citizens safe from crime. On June 17, 1964, border guards arrested a man 
named Reinhard Schwanbeck while he was trying to scale a border fence and escape
to West Berlin. After some questioning he confessed to murdering a young woman 
on the Baltic Sea island of Hiddensee. The NBI proclaimed that the border prevented
the escape of any criminal “for whom it is getting too hot in the GDR.”195 Similarly, 
Attorney General Streit stated in 1966 that the “protective measures” taken on 
August 13, 1961, now prevent criminals from being able to escape justice in the 
GDR simply by buying a twenty pfennig train ticket to West Berlin.196 This 
apparently led to a temporary increase in the recorded crime rate, as more criminals 
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were caught and convicted.197 The rate of officially recorded crimes did indeed rise 
between 1961 and 1963, but this trend had actually started in 1957.198
With the construction of the Berlin Wall and the closing of the inner-German 
border, the SED sealed its citizens off from the West physically. Cutting its citizens 
off from the West psychologically, however, proved to be much more of a 
challenge. Such psychological delimitation (Abgrenzung) was a fundamental aim of 
the Party and a prominent feature of the political culture in the GDR. Achieving this 
goal was made very difficult by the fact that the regime could not prevent the 
apparent prosperity and high living standards of the West from being beamed into 
the homes of its citizens daily. GDR citizens measured the achievements of their 
state against the yardstick of the perceived wealth of the West that they saw in 
Western television programmes and adverts. In light of this, they could only 
conclude that they were the poor relations. To combat this, the SED flooded political
and social life with anti-Western rhetoric.199 Articles in the NBI show that crime and 
criminality played a central role in the Party’s campaign to convince its citizens that,
despite what they might have seen or heard, life in the West was not as perfect as it 
seemed. The magazine’s articles attempted to convince readers that in terms of being
safe from crime and criminality, they were much better off living in the GDR The 
NBI portrayed the West as a place where citizens were afraid of crime. It claimed 
that “in New York people hide behind barred windows. In Munich and Hamburg the
inhabitants in certain districts are afraid to go out after dark.”200 Often when the NBI 
published the GDR’s official crime rate, it accompanied this with charts or tables 
which claimed to show the West German rate, so that readers were able to see a 
comparison in the SED regime’s favor. A piece in 1963 stated that “according to 
West German criminal statistics, 2,120,419 crimes were committed in 1961, over 
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86,000 more than the previous year. That is 3,775 criminal offences per 100,000 
citizens. For comparison: in the GDR the figure was 863’.201 Moreover, the 
magazine showed readers that the types of crimes committed in the West were much
more serious, violent and worthy of the term Verbrechen (which the NBI applied 
unilaterally to crime in the West). There were reports of murders202, armed robberies 
and hostage-taking203, violent assault204, torture205, people trafficking206, drug 
dealing207, and, drug addiction among school children208 (see photograph eight). 
These were all types of crime which the SED regime claimed did not exist or had 
“died out” in the GDR.209 The magazine also communicated to readers that such 
Verbrechen would continue to occur in the West, for they were indelibly linked to 
the nature of capitalist society. The NBI claimed that:
“the [Western] mass media tries to hammer home in the minds of citizens 
that… the egotistical pursuit of profit at the cost of your neighbor and daily 
ruthless dog-eat-dog fighting for your own existence at the cost of others are 
things to be strived for… whoever exalts a society whose everyday fight for 
profit is brutal and violent must not be surprised when this violence penetrates,
his street, his flat. No human warmth can ever come out of such a society.”210 
The NBI thus portrayed crime and criminality as system-immanent phenomena in 
the capitalist West. As opposed to the state of affairs in the socialist society that the 
SED had constructed, these crimes were not “alien” to capitalism, but a hallmark of 
it. Unlike in the GDR, where citizens who strayed could be “re-educated” and crime 
as a phenomenon would eventually die out, citizens in the West would be unsafe and
under threat for as long as they lived in and supported capitalism.
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Representations in the NBI of West German police officers also formed a 
branch of the strand of delimitation from the West which ran through these articles. 
The magazine presented West German police officers as “thugs, murderers and 
instigators”. They were the violent enforcers of the capitalist system in West 
Germany.211 The officers were invariably former Nazis who helped West German 
politicians to cover up the murders of their opponents.212 They also did not intervene 
when opponents of the West German government (including old men and women) 
were beaten up right-wing extremists.213 As opposed to the noble officers of the 
Volkspolizei, West German police officers were the brutal props of their government
and, in fact, criminals themselves.
8. A dead “West




Examination of the SED regime’s policy on the reporting of crime shows that the 
Party set the agenda for the discourse of crime in the GDR in an attempt to shape 
public perceptions of the phenomenon according to the Party’s dominant ideology.214
Writing soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the newly appointed Chief Editor of 
the NBI Siegfried Schröder commented in an editorial (pointedly titled “Out of the 
Procrustean bed”) that, although many journalists in the GDR had never lost their 
ability to perceive reality, they were very rarely permitted to write it.215 Yet the 
reporting about crime in the NBI did reflect the reality of criminality in the GDR in 
as far as the majority of its articles focused on the crime of theft, which according to 
the regime’s official statistics and research since 1990 was the criminal offence most
often committed in the GDR. The NBI, however, underreported considerably violent
crimes in the GDR. Only one piece between 1961 and 1989 featured the murder of a 
native of the GDR by a fellow citizen and only one article about sex crime appeared,
even though the regime’s own figures showed that these offences consistently 
occurred in not insignificant numbers. Despite this and the fact that articles about 
crime rigidly toed the state line with regard to the causes of criminality in the GDR, 
the NBI nevertheless provided citizens with reports of real-life instances of crime. It 
communicated to readers the details of specific criminal incidents, showed them 
photographs of crime scenes and gave names and faces to victims and perpetrators. 
In this sense, the magazine presented citizens with a fuller picture of crime than they
could glean from the theoretical works of the state’s criminologists or the regime’s 
official crime figures.
Analysis of the NBI’s reporting on everyday criminality demonstrates that, 
after the regime achieved the physical delimitation of its citizens from the West 
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through its construction of the Berlin Wall and sealing of the inner-German border in
1961, the Party instrumentalized the phenomenon of crime in its efforts to achieve 
the psychological delimitation of its citizens from the West. First, articles about 
crime in the NBI cast the Berlin Wall as an effective means of crime prevention and 
detection in the GDR. According to these articles, the Wall kept Western criminals 
out and aided the SED regime in catching criminal offenders by closing off one of 
their main escape routes. Presentation of the Wall as a preventer and detector of 
crime--a kind of 3.6-metre-high concrete policeman--suggests that the regime thus 
hoped to ‘normalize’ it as just another part of the regime’s policing measures 
intended to keep citizens and their property safe from criminals. Second, the NBI 
communicated to readers that, because of its capitalist nature, Western society was 
(and always would be) riddled from the bottom to the top with serious and violent 
crime. By directing the media to employ the phenomenon of crime to portray the 
West as a lawless and violent society and thus as a threat not only to citizens and 
their property, but also to their societal values and interests, the SED sought to create
something akin to a permanent “moral panic” among its citizens about the West. 
Such media-induced moral panics are characterized by sensationalist or exaggerated 
reporting of a social problem or group, leading to an increase in the public’s anxiety 
regarding these issues or persons. Ultimately, the NBI communicated to readers that,
for their own safety, the West was definitely not a place that any right-minded 
citizens of the GDR would want to visit, let alone emigrate to.216
Above all, the articles that appeared in the NBI about everyday crime and 
criminality in the GDR communicated to readers that they were safe and secure in 
the GDR. It is possible to identify several characteristics that these articles shared 
which promoted this message. These features are comparable to Yvonne Jewkes’ 
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“crime news values” or criteria that incidents of crime must fulfil in order to be 
deemed newsworthy. Jewkes defines these as the value judgements that editors and 
journalists make when determining if a story has public appeal and is in the public 
interest.217 Of course, given what we know about journalistic processes in the GDR, 
one cannot speak of editors making independent decisions with regard to the content
of their publications. Rather, we must think in terms of the Party’s ‘crime news 
stipulations’ , those identifiable features, under-/overtones and conclusions that the 
regime demanded (and ensured) were included in crime news reports to 
communicate to citizens that they were safe from crime. There are two groups of 
these. The first consists of efforts to downplay the extent and seriousness of crime in
the GDR. The NBI achieved this by focusing on less serious crime, as well as 
through careful marshaling of the language and terminology used to describe 
criminal acts. Articles often also periodically included quotes from regime officials 
claiming that crime rates were decreasing and that “we can quite rightly say that our 
citizens live safely and securely. Our citizens can walk the streets at night without 
having to feel afraid.”218 This begs the question: to what extent was the SED 
successful in convincing its citizens that they were safe from crime? Unfortunately, 
no evidence, such as readers’ letters, was found in the files of the NBI to permit 
conclusions on GDR citizens’ contemporary views. Yet when asked about the 
positive aspects of life in the GDR, many former citizens do often cite their 
perceived lack of crime and criminality under the SED regime.219 This anecdotal 
evidence is supported by the results of a long-term study of the perceptions of 
former East German citizens on a range of social and economic issues. Between 
1993 and 2007 over 60 percent of the participants in the study annually stated that 
they felt from criminality in the dictatorship than they do in the united Germany.220 
44
The extent to which one can attribute these views to SED propaganda is difficult to 
gauge without further research. Karl-Heinz Reuband has claimed that these 
perceptions have more to do with the fact that former citizens have been and are 
exposed to more crime reporting in the media since reunification than they were in 
the GDR.221 Further evidence suggests that former GDR citizens’ fears of crime have
been stoked since reunification by the social upheaval which they have endured and 
a concomitant rise in criminality.222 Moreover, Kelly Hignett found in oral history 
interviews with former citizens of Czechoslovakia that they perceived the crime of 
theft as socially acceptable under the communist regime and not really a crime at all 
because it was necessary to maintain a decent standard of living.223 With the rise in 
living standards since the fall of the Eastern Bloc, perhaps it is the changing 
perceptions on the part of former citizens of what constitutes a crime that has 
contributed to their feeling that they were safer from criminality before 1990. The 
second group of ‘crime news stipulations’ contains features that led or helped 
readers to the conclusion that crime would eventually cease to exist in the GDR. 
Chief among these was the message that the causes of crime in the GDR were 
treatable and curable (as opposed to capitalist society where crime was an inherent 
part of the system). Articles invariably reported that, given time and/or “appropriate 
re-education” the motivation to commit crime--whether that be due to the influence 
of the capitalist relict, alcoholic transgression or “asociality”--could be eliminated, 
thereby ridding GDR society of crime as a phenomenon. Significantly, the articles 
made clear that the only cure for the causes of crime and therefore the only way that 
citizens would be completely safe and secure from crime was to live according to 
the tenets of the socialist society that the Party had constructed and encourage others
to do so. The articles about criminality in the GDR that appeared in the NBI thus 
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demonstrate that the SED regime used the phenomenon of crime to attempt to 
construct legitimacy through the media for and to co-opt citizens into the Party’s 
socialist project. 
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